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Without any doubt the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon caused a dramatic change in the international system. After that incident the 
relative security that Western nations have been enjoying since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union has been seriously called into question. The U.S. can be considered as the main 
target of these new attacks, although its European allies do not seem to be spared, 
especially when we look at the bombings in Madrid and London. To give a convincing 
response to this new threat, the U.S. engaged itself in military confrontations with 
terrorists and their supporters in Afghanistan and Iraq. But, while recognizing the 
importance of such actions, it seems to be clear to everyone that they are not sufficient to 
effectively respond to the threat posed by these new enemies. In fact, terrorists do not 
form an identifiable army, so they are not easy to locate, thus, conventional methods of 
fighting are not sufficient in this particular case. 
In addition to military strikes the West should therefore concentrate more on 
eliminating the conditions that help terrorists to expand and spread their ideas. 
Eradicating the so-called root causes of terrorism should also be one of the solutions to these 
security problems. Development co-operation in this particular case seems to be the 
appropriate domain of relations between rich terror-threatened countries on the one hand 
and willingly or unwillingly terror-friendly developing nations on the other hand, which 
can contribute to the elimination of the conditions on which terror feeds. Since many 
political scientists and politicians agree on the fact that development policy can play a very 
important role in the fight against terrorism, the aim of this paper is to present the two 
main theoretical approaches which can serve this purpose: 
 On the one hand, we have the development strategic approach which can be related to 
the school of thought that is loyal to the "root causes discourse" and sees a direct link 
between terrorism and underdevelopment. This approach would like to prevent new 
terrorists from rising by concentrating on eliminating the conditions on which terror 
thrives. It would base itself on long-term projects of poverty eradication, such as the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). On the other hand, we have the geo-strategic approach,1 
                                                 
1 Both the development strategic and the geo-strategic approach have been previously used by Nicolaus von der Goltz, 
"Entwicklungspolitik nach dem 11. September 2001: Hilfe oder Anti-Terror-Dividende?" In: DAP (Dresdner 
Arbeitspapiere), No. 7, 2003, pp. 10-13. 
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which on its part could be adopted by those who do not see any direct link between 
terrorism and underdevelopment. This approach would concentrate on eliminating 
already existing and immediate forms of terrorism. Such a strategy would rather select and 
reward the few countries which it considers as strategically important in the "War on 
Terror" and, for this reason, it can only distribute short-term aid in the form of anti-terror 
dividends. 
 
Using development policy to combat terrorism: Two main approaches 
 
Most of the people who do not want terrorism to be related to underdevelopment, 
and therefore vehemently oppose the so-called root causes discourse, always base their 
argument on empirical research which shows that it is not the manifestations of the 
absence of development (e.g. poverty or illiteracy) that trigger terrorism. Such research 
always mentions the fact that Osama bin Laden is not a poor man and that he comes 
from the richest non-royal Saudi family; that Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s principal 
strategist, deputy leader and designated successor, is a surgeon who comes from one of 
the most educated families in Egypt.2 Other reasons advanced are that bin Laden has 
never claimed to be acting on behalf of the poor and illiterates, or that his goal is to 
redress the disparity between rich and poor countries… In addition to that it is being said 
in a contradictory manner that poverty can exist without terrorism… as it does today in 
most of sub-Saharan Africa.3 It becomes obvious here that if poverty can exist without 
terrorism, then it implies that in some other cases it cannot. In addition to that sub-
Saharan Africa is not a good example, since many terrorist groups take advantage of the 
continent’s socio-economic and political problems to gain the support of some of its 
citizens. 
 We have to make a distinction here between those who lead terror groups and 
those who can be considered as their followers. The fact that terror leaders like Osama 
bin Laden are educated multimillionaires should not surprise anybody because for such 
groups to function they need a lot of financial means. On the other hand, they also need 
                                                 
2 Rohan Gunaratna, Terrorism in the South Before and After 9/11: An overlooked Phenomenon, Contribution to: Responding to 
Terrorism: What Role for the United Nations? [Conference organized by the International Peace Academy on 25-26 
October 2002 in New York], p. 34. 
3 Gary T. Dempsey, "Old Folly in a New Disguise: Nation Building to Combat Terrorism." In: Cato Policy Analysis, 
No. 429, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa429.pdf, March 21, 2002, p. 4. 
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people who are able to accept to die for the reasons their leaders advance. This is where 
the poor or illiterate person comes into play. Recent observations of modern terrorist 
groups indicate that some terrorists come from broken homes, where the father is absent, 
estranged, or economically or politically impotent. Additionally, some terrorist group 
joiners are individuals who have had difficulties in forming consistent group identities 
outside home, such as at school and/or the workplace. It is certain that this partial 
background profile is not universal, if we look, for example, at the cases of the 9/11 
hijackers who were college-educated individuals from professional two-parent middle-
class homes. Nonetheless, it appears that terrorist group joiners from dysfunctional family 
backgrounds are particularly susceptible to the seductive message of charismatic leaders, 
who offer them their first positively meaningful group experience.4 At this point it 
becomes obvious that there are some rich terrorists and that not all the poor 
automatically become terrorists. It is also apparent that terrorist leaders can recruit more 
fighters in a poor environment than in a rich one. For this reason, the former World Bank 
president once said that, "it is easier to train terrorists in Afghanistan than when they have 
a comfortable life in Frankfurt."5
 There seems to be some kind of reluctance to recognize the direct link that exists 
between terrorism and the situation lived particularly by the majority of Africans and 
Asians (keyword: "underdevelopment"). While the U.S. and Britain are impatient with any 
definition of terrorism which seeks to address root causes… poor countries in particular 
stress structural causes and would like to see a more comprehensive approach to the 
problem of terrorism. By believing that it is the Western civilization that is the target of 
those "barbarians," the U.S. and Britain, in particular, seem to have no appreciation of 
proportion in terms of the fatalities that result from structural terrorism and occur in the 
majority of the world’s societies. They also have lost a sense of history, because they seem to 
have no memory of similar occurrences elsewhere in the world, even when those occurrences 
might have emanated from them. What can be added to this loss of proportion and memory 
is a deliberate rejection of the search for causality, mainly because such a search, if 
combined with proportion and history, will inevitably lead to the West as the perpetrator 
                                                 
4 Anthony Stahelski, Terrorist Are Made, Not Born: Creating Terrorists Using Social Psychological Conditioning, 
http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/stahelski.html, March 2004, pp. 1-2. 
5 James Wolfensohn, "Wir brauchen einen Exekutivausschuss, der die Welt regiert." In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
September 9, 2004, p. 6. 
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of structural terrorism.6 Such a tactic is self-defeating because eliminating the root causes 
of a problem is more efficient than fighting against its forms of manifestation. 
 The various ways of considering the link that exists between terrorism and 
underdevelopment can lead – in the domain of development policy – to two main 
strategies which can be used in the fight against terrorism. On the one hand, the attention 
will be focused on the root causes. On the other hand, this attention shall be more 
directed towards the external manifestations of terrorism. If we borrow medical terms, 
the first strategy would concentrate on preventing the illness from happening; this 
corresponds to the school of thought that puts its main emphasis on the structural 
essence of terrorism. This approach, which is no less concerned with manifest violence 
and with putting an end to it, seeks to transcend the so-called fire-fighting approach in search 
for the causes of the fires. Meanwhile, the second one would concentrate on curing the 
already existing illness. It corresponds to the school of thought that puts its main 
emphasis on direct forms of terrorism. It is an approach that stresses behavioral factors 
and is more preoccupied with the occurrence of violence and how to put an end to it, 
rather than explaining why violence occurs in the first place. It automatically gives birth to 
a fire-fighting strategy and anything that seems to detract from it is regarded as being 
obstructive.7 The terms that we are going to use here to qualify both strategies are: the 
development strategic approach for the first one, and the geo-strategic approach for the second one. 
While the first one would be holistic and development-oriented, the second one would be 
selective and power-oriented.8
 
The development strategic approach 
 
 The development strategic approach would agree with a DAC Reference Document 
which believes that development co-operation does have an important role to play when 
it comes to depriving terrorists of popular support and addressing the conditions that 
terrorist leaders feed on and exploit. The same document goes further by mentioning that 
many conditions that allow terrorists to be politically successful, build and expand 
                                                 
6 Mwesiga Baregu, Beyond September 11: Structural Causes and Behavioral Consequences of International Terrorism, Contribution 
to: Responding to Terrorism: What Role for the United Nations? [Conference organized by the International Peace Academy 
on 25-26 October 2002 in New York], p. 42. 
7 Mwesiga Baregu, p. 42. 
8 Von der Goltz, p. 10. 
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constituencies, find, establish and finance terrorist organizations, and secure safe haven, 
fall within the realm and primary concerns of development co-operation. That implies 
that donor countries can reduce support for terrorism by working towards preventing 
conditions that give rise to violent conflicts in general and that convince disaffected 
groups to embrace terrorism in particular.9 Such an approach does not mean that 
development policy should continue to be practiced, as it has been the case in the past, 
but that fundamental changes should be made. 
 It is not the short-term personal economic and political interest of donor countries 
that should be at the forefront here, but rather long-term amelioration of the living 
conditions of the world’s poor in general and those living in Africa and Asia in particular. 
Harald Mueller recommends a "Weltsozialpolitik," a term that can be interpreted as social 
welfare for the world. He is here asking rich countries to prove to people in poor regions 
of the world and who have difficulties to cope with the consequences of globalization 
that the West is aware of their problems.10 He is asking the international community to 
finally devote itself to the problems of the poor in a way that is clear and understandable. 
On his part, Jim Redden, policy director for the Australian Council for Overseas Aid, 
advocates among other things, a highly desirable concept of global taxation that aims at 
redistributing from the rich to the poor.11 In other words, development policy should 
finally be considered as aid. 
  All of these recommendations also mean that the MDGs should be the base of all 
development program and nothing else; that donor countries do not only have to refine 
and consolidate the capacity of instruments that are at the service of development co-
operation, but also have to carry out a more coherent development policy both at the 
national and international level. Such a policy would change the global general framework, 
especially the one relative to the world economic system. As an example, the world trade 
system should be adapted to the needs of developing countries. 
 In more concrete terms, adopting a development strategic approach would mean that 
donor countries have to open their markets to products from developing countries, 
                                                 
9 DAC Reference Document, A Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorism Prevention: Key Entry Points for Action, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/4/16085708.pdf, p. 11. 
10 Harald Mueller, Den Schock verarbeiten: Nach dem 11. September – Von der Sprache des Terrors zu politischen 
Handlungsoptionen, HSFK-Standpunkt No. 4/2002, Frankfurt a.M., Hessische Stiftung für Friedens- und 
Konfliktforschung, http://www.learnline.de/angebote/rechtsextremismus/medio/Hintergrund/grundor_mat/ 
Mueller_Schock.pdf, 2001, pp. 13-14. 
11 Dempsey, p. 7. 
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support African countries’ right to import or produce generic versions of HIV/AIDS 
medications that are still under Western patent; giving developing countries the 
opportunity and time to develop their own ways and means to get out of poverty;12 and 
stop giving subsidies to their farmers, because in so doing they only take back with one 
hand what they generously give with the other hand in aid. Donor governments have to 
explain to their farmers that agricultural protection in its present form eats away the 
already meager income of the poor in developing countries.13 The West should stop 
spending six times more on their farmers than what they spend on foreign aid.14 It is not 
quite normal that subsidized maize from the West is cheaper on the African market than 
the locally grown one. If "trade and not aid" is the motto, then it should be done by fair 
means. 
 Donors should also be ready to put more resources aside for development co-
operation than in the past. The additional money could be used in the promotion of 
democracy and democratic institutions, part of it could also be used to support the civil 
society. Education, health and food security should not be forgotten.15 According to 
Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs, by devoting just a few tenths of a percent of America’s 
gross domestic product to foreign aid, the U.S. government could save millions of lives in 
poor countries and ensure that the basic needs of health and education are met for all 
impoverished children in this world.16 To support that developing countries have to be 
given more rights to have a say in international decision-making processes and more 
space should be given to a mutually developed solution to common problems.17 
According to the already mentioned DAC Reference Document what development co-
operation can do to help in the anti-terror campaign could be summarized as follows: 
 
- Bolster long-term structural stability; 
- dissuade disaffected groups from embracing terrorism and other forms of violence; 
- deny groups or individuals the means to carry out terrorism: reinforce governance, strengthen political 
governance and work with fragile countries and failed states; 
                                                 
12 Von der Goltz, p. 10. 
13 Benjamin W. Mkapa, "Cancùn’s False Promise: A View from the South." In: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 3, 2004, 
p. 133. 
14 "How to Give Africa Hope." In: New Statesman, Vol. 15, February 11, 2002, pp. 4-5. 
15 Von der Goltz, pp. 10-11. 
16 Dempsey, p. 7. 
17 Von der Goltz, pp. 10-11. 
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- strive for coherent, complementary and consistent policies: sustain broad-based international co-operation 
and reinforce inclusive globalization.18
 
Though all these recommendations are of extreme importance, they are not 
sufficient. Governments of poor countries also have to change their way of doing things. 
And the development strategic approach is very important here, because since it is not tied to 
any self-interest of donors, it can impose conditions to be respected by recipient countries 
and is able to sanction governments which are not open to reforms. In so doing, donors 
should make sure that the conditions they impose remain realistic – in other words, based 
on the realities in the recipient countries concerned. Donors should know that because of 
social and cultural differences, policies that have been successfully applied in region or 
country A must not automatically be applicable in region or country B. If the 
governments of poor countries still happened to refuse to respect this realistic 
conditionality, then donors could target aid more on the political forces in recipient 
countries, which not only support liberalization but also are highly critical of its success. 
Political parties, the legislature, the judiciary, the press, and civil associations could be 
supported,19 depending on how serious they are. Government officials in poor countries 
are rich people and ignore most of the time or do not care about the real needs of their 
people. So directly reaching the people should be the main goal of aid officers. 
The development strategic approach includes automatically all developing countries who 
want to be included. And it implies a long-term effort towards eradicating poverty, 
illiteracy, lack of participation – in short, it aims at developing those countries in a 
sustainable manner. This approach primarily follows long-term security interests. In the 
case of Africa, for example, a fundamental change of the conditions of lawlessness and 
alienation that empower leaders to terrorize their own citizens and enables movements 
such as al-Qaeda to have a substantial following, has to be made.20 It implies being 
proactive in preventing violent conflicts in the future. And thus makes it possible to 
guarantee development for the poor and global security at the same time. Choosing this 
approach does not only mean that the West has to be patient, but also that it has to stay 
calm when faced by provocation from terrorists in order not to fall into the temptation of 
                                                 
18 DAC Reference Document, A Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorism Prevention: Key Entry Points for Action. For 
more details see pp. 12-19. 
19 Carol Lancaster, Aid to Africa: So much to Do, Chicago UP, Chicago 1999, p. 14. 
20 Greg Mills, "Africa’s New Strategic Significance." In: The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 27 (49), 2004, pp. 66-67. 
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using a strategy that could produce result on a short-term basis without being able to 
prevent future attacks. 
 
The geo-strategic approach 
 
The geo-strategic approach is geared exactly towards such results. Development policy 
here will return to Cold War practices and can only take the form of anti-terror dividends 
in the global war against terrorism. In that case the financial aspect of development co-
operation is going to play a very important role. Since development aid money is going to 
be used flexibly and selectively to compensate developing countries for their support of 
the anti-terror campaign. In so doing, favors such as over-flight rights, the construction of 
military bases, or diplomatic support could be bought.21 This return to Cold War practices 
would mean here that conditionality will be absent in aid and that aid shall be given even 
to authoritarian regimes, as long as they give the West the support it needs in its war 
against transnational terrorism. Even a leader like Mugabe, who is presently vehemently 
criticized by donors, would all of a sudden become an ally and a friend, if his country 
could in any way serve Western security interests. The sudden economic support received 
by Pakistan after 9/11 serves as a good example for such practices. 
With the geo-strategic approach it is going to be impossible to impose political or 
economical reforms on aid, because the West would be on the begging side and its 
impatient need for immediate and visible result would not allow it to resist the temptation 
of helping even the most authoritarian regimes, just to gain their support. Just as during 
the Cold War, African leaders, for example, are going to take advantage of the present 
situation to eliminate the opposition in their countries. In Uganda, for instance, experts 
believe that there can only be a political solution to the problems posed by the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA), but Museveni, pumped by his new role as an ally in the "War on 
Terror," has placed the LRA on the Terrorists Exclusion List, stepped up – with 
America’s support – an ineffective military campaign against the rebels. With the geo-
strategic approach much more of such reactions are to be expected, as leaders of developing 
countries are already learning to play the "War on Terrorism Game" with the 
                                                 
21 Von der Goltz, p. 11. 
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consummate skill they once applied to the Cold War one, feeding off Western anxiety to 
secure weapons and no-question asked funding.22
The fact that the geo-strategic approach would not be able to impose political and 
socio-economic reforms as conditions for aid, because the short term security interests it 
follows can only be provided by national governments and not by the people, makes the 
approach very vulnerable in the long run. The short-term anti-terror dividends might end 
up becoming "terror dividends" if the people in poor countries started identifying the 
West as the supporter of their authoritarian and pseudo-democratic regimes. Only the 
opposite of security is going to be obtained, if the West engages itself in a policy that 
gives, to use the words of Nuscheler, "anti terror discounts for human rights."23
If we take Africa as an example, the geo-strategic approach with its selective tactics will 
more concretely concentrate on regions and countries were terrorism is already a reality or 
is threatening to become a reality in the near future. The Horn of Africa, because of its 
links to the Islamic world and its past experience with terrorism, would be a great case of 
concern; Nigeria and South Africa because of the fast growing Islamic fundamentalism 
among their Muslim populations and the presence of huge Western investments on their 
soil; Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the DRC because of their diamond, which is more and 
more considered by terrorists as a source of income. Other regions and countries on the 
continent would be of very little importance. But this could change, since the geo-strategic 
approach is flexible, and would not hesitate to divert supports from one country to 
another, or to add some other countries to its list as soon as they become strategically 
more important, just as it was the case during the Cold War. 
We have to make it clear here that the type of development aid emanating from 
the geo-strategic approach must not be considered automatically as being negative, because, if 
used well, it can also bring development to the countries that receive it. But the condition 
that is needed for such a positive outcome is "good governance." A development-
oriented government can use such an aid efficiently by investing it in the basic needs of its 
people. In addition to that it should be clear that both the geo-strategic and the development 
strategic approach can play an important role in the global anti-terror campaign. 
 
                                                 
22 Michael Wrong, "World view." In: New Statesman, Vol. 17, 2004, p. 10. 
23 Franz Nuscheler, "Ueberforderte Entwicklungspolitik: Veraenderungen nach dem 11. September." In: Internationale 
Politik, Vol. 57 (11), 2002, p. 4. 
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The need to combine both approaches 
 
Both approaches are part of a variety of measures that aim at combating terrorism. 
The geo-strategic approach can be very useful in regions where the terrorism threat is present 
or imminent, meanwhile, the development strategic approach could bring good results in 
regions were the threat could become reality later in future. To come back to our use of 
medical terms, we can say here that in medicine both curative and preventive methods 
can be used against an illness depending on whether the illness has already manifested 
itself or not. For this reason, both strategies do not exclude each other, and it is quite 
possible that the more short-term oriented geo-strategic approach and the long-term oriented 
development strategic approach could complement each other. It is true that the short-term 
approach will support undemocratic and bad governing regimes, but maybe that is the 
price that has to be paid in order to enjoy the bit of security that is needed to put a long-
term strategy in place. 
There is certainly no security without development, but the reverse is also true. 
Moreover, it would also be very difficult for the West to apply the development political 
approach without collaborating with the so-called bad performers and governments that have 
a questionable human right record.24 At this point it then becomes obvious that any 
development policy that is aiming at fighting terrorism is obliged to use both the 
development strategic and the geo-strategic approach. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Taking into consideration the fact that military action alone is not sufficient in the 
fight against terrorism, unless it is associated with other non-military strategies, we tried to 
prove here that an instrument like development policy could even be more effective than 
military intervention, when it comes to combating terrorism. It has two strategies at its 
disposal: the geo-strategic approach and the development strategic approach. The geo-strategic 
approach, just like military intervention, does produce immediate results but cannot prevent 
terrorism from growing. Meanwhile, the development strategic approach, which is rather a long-
term strategy, aims at attacking the root causes of terrorism. For this reason, it needs 
                                                 
24 Von der Goltz, p. 12. 
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some time before its results can be felt. Therefore we came here to the conclusion that 
one strategy cannot be used without the other; they are only effective when used in 
combination. The combined use of both strategies consolidates the position of 
development policy as one of the main pillars in the global fight against terrorism. An 
anti-terror campaign that does not include the non-military means offered by 
development policy will certainly be ineffective and is condemned to end up in failure. 
 11
